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Based on participant observation in a team of British policy making civil servants carried out in 
2009, this article examines the use that is made of evidence in making policy. It shows that these 
civil servants displayed a high level of commitment to the use of evidence. However, their use of 
evidence was hampered by the huge volume of various kinds of evidence and by the unsuitability 
of much academic research in answering policy questions. Faced with this deluge of inconclusive 
information, they used evidence to create persuasive policy stories. These stories were useful 
both in making acceptable policies and in advancing careers. They often involved the excision of 
methodological uncertainty and the use of ‘killer charts’ to boost the persuasiveness of the 
narrative. In telling these stories, social inequality was ‘silently silenced’ in favour of promoting 
policies which were ‘totemically’ tough. The article concludes that this selective, narrative use of 
evidence is ideological in that it supports systematically asymmetrical relations of power. 
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There has been much discussion in recent years of ‘evidence-based policy’ (Black 2001; Boaz 
and Pawson 2005; Wyatt 2002). Tony Blair became Prime Minister in 1997 promising to replace 
‘outdated ideology’ with a concern for ‘what works’ (Labour Party 1997). But, disillusion soon 
set in, summed up in the phrase, ‘policy-based evidence’ (Glees 2005; Stimson 2001; Tombs and 
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Whyte 2003). Despite repeated criticisms of the use made of evidence in making policy  (e.g. 
Barton 2003; Berridge and Thom 1996; Gendreau, Goggin, Cullen, and Paparozzi 2002; 
Naughton 2005; Stevens 2007a; Tonry 2004; Young 2003), there is still a ‘perplexing silence … 
about the social world of the policy-making process’ (Tombs 2003: 5), although there have been 
occasional interruptions (e.g. Page and Jenkins 2005, Smith 2007). Hill’s (2009) impressive 
summary of work in this area notes the paucity of direct examinations of the policy process, 
which tends to be examined through analysis of its outputs or of accounts given by their 
producers, rather than through close observation.  
 
Hill also notes the difficulty of pinning down a precise definition of policy making. He warns 
that, while this is widely assumed to be a rational process of fitting means to ends, this 
assumption should not be made in advance of empirical examination of the policy process. 
Similar difficulties arise over the definition of evidence. What counts as evidence is itself a 
politically loaded discussion (Monaghan 2008, Nutley, Walter and Davies 2007). In this article, 
policy-making will be taken to refer to the organised attempt to select goals and methods for 
governmental action, whether rational or not. What counts as evidence will be taken as one of 
empirical topics to be addressed (see the section on the ‘oversaturation of evidence’ below). This 
article contributes to the development of a coherent explanation of the use of such items of 
evidence in policy-making by combining previous theoretical contributions with ethnographic 
data from a study of the practice of policy making in the UK government. The main research 
question that it seeks to inform is: how do policy makers use evidence? 
 
Method and ethics 
 
In 2009, I worked as a policy adviser for six months on a placement in a policy making section 
of the UK civil service. The team I worked in had responsibility for advising the highest levels of 
government about policy on a range of social policy and criminal justice areas. I worked at the 
middle-ranking level, just below the ‘senior civil service’ grades. This is the level where Page 
and Jenkins (2005) found that much policy making is actually done in the UK civil service. I 
carried out desk research, responded to requests for information, developed policy proposals, 
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represented the section at inter-departmental meetings, seminars and conferences, and generally 
shared the working life of the team. While carrying out this work, I observed the work of my 
colleagues and their interactions with other civil servants and with special advisers to ministers. I 
made fieldnotes as soon as I could after these observations took place. I also interviewed five of 
the civil servants with whom I had worked at the end of the process. The aim of these interviews 
was to ask for their reflections on the use of evidence in policy making, which I could then 
compare with the observations that I had recorded. 
 
As I became convinced that I would want to publish an analysis of my experience, I asked 
permission to interview and write about my work from colleagues within my team. I decided not 
to ask for informed consent from all the people I observed. The British Sociological 
Association’s (2002) code of ethics states that covert research can be justified when overt 
research would change the behaviour of participants and where access is controlled by powerful 
interests.  It would have been impractical to seek formal consent from everyone I worked with. 
But more importantly, it would have increased reactivity. I wanted to observe and participate in 
the work of policy making with the least possible disturbance to the usual process. And the 
people I was observing could hardly be described as vulnerable. They are powerful people, with 
high levels of financial and cultural capital, engaged in work that, while hidden from public view, 
was carried out on behalf of the public and paid for by the taxpayer.  The people quoted in this 
article were among those who gave verbal informed consent to take part in this research. I have 
attempted to protect their anonymity by using false names for them in this article. I do not give 
details of the units they were working in or the particular policies they were working on where 
that could lead easily to their identification. The study was approved by the University of Kent’s 
internal ethics committee.  
 
Methodologically, ethnography can provide a picture of only a limited range of reality. I cannot 
claim that the data I obtained is representative of the entire body of British civil servants, let 
alone of other actors (inside and outside government) who play a part in making policy. The 
areas I worked on are highly politicized (Monaghan 2010, Young 2003). It may be that evidence 
is used differently in other policy areas, with lower levels of political salience (Tonry 2004) and 
4 
 
where there is less public conviction that certain, evidently ineffective interventions should be 
used (Tilley and Laycock 2000). I hope, however, that this study reveals at least some of the 
mechanisms that characterize the policy-making process. By participating in the use of evidence 
for policy purposes, and in discussing and observing this process with people who do it every 
day, I was able to gather data that we can use to develop and test theory in this area.  
 
Theoretically, this is hardly uncharted territory. It would have been wasteful to ignore all the 
previous attempts to explain the evidence-policy link by limiting myself to the development of 
theory from the data alone (Glaser and Strauss 1967) or by replicating the ‘barefoot empiricism’ 
of Page and Jenkins (2005: vii). So I decided to follow Layder´s (1998) approach of ‘adaptive 
coding’. This involved generating a list of provisional codes from my previous work in this area 
(Stevens 2007a) and from the existing literature. This included: the sophisticated pluralist 
approaches of Weiss (1977; 1999), Dunn (1993), Gans (1971), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1993), Nutley and her co-authors (Nutley, Walter, and Bland 2002) and John (1998); the ‘post-
foundationalist’ approaches of  Hajer (1995) and Valentine (2009); and various contributions 
from critical theory, including the work of Thompson (1990), Bourdieu (2000) and Habermas 
(1984; 2002).  
 
As I coded the fieldnotes and interview transcripts, using QSR Nvivo software, I highlighted 
observations and quotes that related to these provisional codes, as well as generating new codes 
as other concepts emerged from the data. With initial coding complete, I then went through the 
codes and their content to reconsider, reorganize and reformulate the analysis to which the 
coding contributed. This process resulted in the identification of eight key themes, which are 
discussed below.  
 
Commitment to the use of evidence 
 
My observations and discussions with civil servants suggested that they are not very different 
from academics, at least to the extent that they have to display competence in the use of scientific 
reason in order to win reputations which lead to personal and professional status and reward 
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(Bourdieu 2000). The civil servants I worked with were highly committed to the use of evidence. 
One of them told me, ‘it’s the job of officials to tell truth to power’. Evidence was ever-present 
in the development, discussion and presentation of the policies whose construction I observed. 
So the first casualty of my emerging analysis was the idea that policy is ‘evidence-free’ (The 
Economist 2009). As for the policy makers that Weiss (1977) interviewed, civil servants thought 
it proper to use evidence.  One of my interviewees told me, ‘evidence is a prerequisite for policy’. 
Another said, ‘evidence should be the basis for options we put to ministers… evidence-based 
policy is part of the way that we work.’ So we need to examine how this part of the work 
operates. However, as Weiss also found, they often saw evidence being used to justify existing 
policy rather than to develop wholly rational interventions. All my interviewees were able to 
report instances where evidence had not been used. So we also need to explain this gap between 
the normative commitment to the use of evidence and these policy outcomes.  
 
The oversaturation of evidence in policy 
 
The UK government, through its managerialist attempts to control the performance of public 
sector actors, operates a massive exercise in the collection and storage of data. The many reports 
that result from analysis of these datasets have to jostle for attention with a host of other 
evidence. In coding my fieldnotes, I counted 15 types of evidence that were entered into policy 
debates. In addition to internally collected government data and externally produced academic 
analysis, the list included opinion polls, reports by thinktanks (e.g. ippr, Policy Exchange, Centre 
for Social Justice, etc.) and from management consultancies, previous policy papers produced by 
various parts of the civil service, independent inquiries, reports of the inspectorates of police and 
prisons, internal and externally commissioned evaluations of policy initiatives, various kinds of 
reports from abroad, press reports, television programmes (examples from HBO’s The Wire were 
mentioned several times), personal experience and opinion. Information from parliamentary 
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 This approach was so widespread that a meeting on workforce development concluded that there was a need for 




A colleague told me, when I asked him how he looks for evidence when working on a new 
policy, about: 
a depressingly similar pattern where you look for the best - usually quantitative data - you can 
find, and then, as you work through the policy problem you establish that there is not the best 
evidence that you want and you work your way down until, at the end, you’re left with the odd 
case study, something which was kind of half evaluated, some anecdotal information and then 
what you can garner through a few field visits.  
 
Thousands of articles and books have been written on the policy areas on which this civil servant 
works. The ignoring of these academic outputs can be partly explained by the ‘unsuitabilities’ of 
social science research for use in evidence that Gans (1971) highlighted. The questions that 
policy makers tend to ask include: what should be done in practice; how will it work; what will 
the effects be; how much will it cost; will there be any adverse consequences; and on whom will 
they fall? Very little of the evidence that is available to policy makers – including only a very 
small minority of academic papers - provides conclusive answers to such questions (Tilley and 
Laycock 2000). In using evidence, policy makers therefore have to pick and choose from the 
available evidence. Evidence becomes a solute in the oversaturated solution of policy problems. 
There is more evidence than can be absorbed, so some is taken in for use and some is not. The 
problem with this naturalistic metaphor is that it cannot illuminate the role of human agency. 
From my observations, the key to understanding this process is to pay attention to the way 





                                                                                                                                                                                           
their evidence to have impact on policy are therefore to make sure that it is available through open access and that it 




As one of my civil service colleagues told me, policy making civil servants know they have done 
their job when their proposals are accepted as government policy. In order to do this job, they 
have to persuade other people, within and outside government, that their proposals are worth 
acting on. Other writers have concentrated on the relations between government and external 
actors (Hajer 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). During my fieldwork, the most important 
influences on policy acceptance that I observed were the relations between people within 
government. The state is not the neutral arbiter between opposing policy proposals that is 
presented in Dunn’s (1993) ‘jurisprudential’ model of policy arguments. It is the source of many 
of these ideas, and the daily life of policy makers is spent in discussion and argument with other 
actors within the state. 
 
To achieve acceptance, policy proposals have to be agreed by a wide range of senior civil 
servants, special advisers and, eventually, ministers in the various departments that have an 
interest. I observed determined efforts to ensure that these agreements would favour the 
proposals that my team was working on. The focus of these efforts was often on the ‘narrative’ 
of a particular proposal. Indeed, narrative was a constant theme in the creation of new policies, 
echoing Hajer’s (1995) insistence on the importance of ‘story-telling’ in influencing which 
proposals will be taken up. It was interesting that this emphasis on narrative had relevance 
outside the field of environmental policy, within which Hajer developed it. 
 
In working up policy documents, colleagues would examine – often in very great detail - the 
internal coherence of drafts and the way in which they led the reader to the conclusion that the 
suggested policy was the only alternative that made sense. One example that I worked on was the 
document which presented a new policy initiative. In order to demonstrate that urgent action was 
necessary, I was asked to draft a short section that would lay out the scale of the problem (in 
money terms) and the recent trends in its development.  I found it difficult to be precise, given 
the very wide uncertainties that are acknowledged in the academic literature on the topic, but I 
produced a summary of the available evidence. This became the focus for weeks of refinement, 
inter-departmental argument and revision. The document was passed between many colleagues 
in my team and others which had an interest in the policy area. The caveats that I had inserted on 
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the uncertainties in the literature were quickly removed. Whenever the document came back to 
me, with more questions in the accompanying email, I would try and reinsert some of them. 
 
 When the document that resulted from this repetitive process was sent to the analytical section 
of another department, a fierce email exchange broke out. The other department’s analyst was 
very concerned at some of the estimates that we had used, as they might conflict with what his 
unit had published in the field. At this point, Phillip, my colleague who was leading work on the 
document, sent him a placatory email. He asserted that the figures - which he had denuded of 
accompanying caveats - were reliable, as they had been produced by an academic (i.e. me). This 
attempt to justify the figures on the basis of academic authority rather than their evidential status 
failed when I insisted that I would not have included the figures without caveats in any academic 
publication. Phillip told me, ‘we have to strike a balance. We don’t want to overclaim, but we 
need to sell the policy’. In the end, the document included a headline estimate which had no 
supporting evidence, but had previously been published in a government report. Some of the 
caveats were included, but placed in an annex at the back of the published document. 
 
This episode exemplifies how evidence is used as a tool for persuasion (to ‘sell the policy’) 
within government, as well as in relations between government, the public and other agencies. 
An even more striking example was reported to me of a high level meeting where an extremely 
senior civil servant had used the promising results of an evaluation of a particular scheme. The 
evaluation itself was not particularly rigorous. It had no control group, but did show - in common 
with many other social interventions - that people who are intervened with at the peak of their 
problems tend to get better after this intervention.  This lack of methodological rigour did not 
prevent the use of the evaluation by the top civil servant who led the meeting in persuading a 
number of departments to make savings from their existing budgets in order to expand the 
favoured scheme.  
 




One of the apparent purposes of creating coherent policy narratives was to reduce the role of 
uncertainty as a barrier to action. As predicted by Sanderson (2004), uncertainty was seen by 
many of my colleagues as the enemy of policy making. If we are unsure of what the real problem 
is, and we cannot predict the effects of our actions, then we would not, they implied, get 
anything done. My discussion of caveats in the work with Phillip was characterised by our team 
leader, Mike, as ‘verging on the philosophical’. He evidently saw them as an obstacle to the 
practical issue of what action to take, right here, right now. Uncertainty, which is – of course - a 
fundamental feature of knowledge (Bhaskar 1978), threatens to disrupt the narrative of a policy. 
It was rarely entertained in the policy documents which I worked on and saw being ‘put up’ to 
special advisers and ministers. Indeed, the very form of these documents denied uncertainty. 
Many policy documents transmitted between policy making civil servants were in the form of 
PowerPoint ‘packs’, stuffed with bullet points, diagrams, short text boxes and simple graphs. 
None of these permitted lengthy discussion of the uncertain or imprecise nature of the knowledge 
they presented.  
 
The use of graphs was particularly interesting. In an induction session early in my fieldwork, 
they were referred to as ‘killer charts’. We were taught to construct these instruments of 
persuasion by choosing data carefully and by restricting the number of cases and categories that 
were shown. The policy implications of the data should be immediately apparent from the graph 
alone. This last recommendation obviously ignores the common academic criticism that statistics, 
even where they represent an underlying reality, are socially and selectively constructed (Prior 
2003), and cannot (or should not) simply ‘speak for themselves’. A graph is a visual 
representation of the results of that construction, which renders invisible the process of 
construction. In my subsequent work, many hours were spent searching for data that could be 
used to make such graphs, and many discussions were had of how to construct them. I knew I 
had succeeded in making a ‘killer chart’ the day that a senior civil servant responded unprompted 
to a graph that I presented.  He used it to argue for more urgent action than his colleagues were 




The control of uncertainty strengthens the narrative of a policy document. But it also plays a 
wider role in structuring the context in which civil servants operate. Mike’s comment on caveats 
reflected the reality that if we were to worry incessantly and individually about the profound 
limits to our knowledge of the world we inhabit, then collective action could not emerge. Social 
order, according to Douglas (1987) rests on our abilities to sacrifice some of our individual 
freedom of thought in order that peace and predictability can prevail. This enables collective 
action and also satisfies individual needs. Collective styles of thinking come to shape beliefs in 
order ‘to satisfy the individual demand for order and coherence’ (Ibid: 19). People find in 
following the strictures of institutional thinking that they also maximise the utility they gain from 
transactions with others. The civil service ‘thought world’ (Ibid) shuns uncertainty. And there are 
understandable, utility maximising reasons for this. 
 
Bureaucratic competence and the civil service career 
 
Utility has at least two meanings. One general sense is usefulness, as in something that is of use 
in carrying out a task. Another, more narrowly economic sense is the use that something has for 
the pursuit of personal goals. For civil servants, the maximisation of both types of utility can 
coincide. If they make themselves useful to the task of creating and carrying out policy, then they 
are more likely to achieve their own goals of professional advancement. This became clear in 
discussing the civil service career with my colleagues and from observing civil servants 
performing their tasks. The pressures and incentives that they experience in developing their 
careers are important in understanding how they came to use evidence for policy stories. 
 
In pubs and bars around Whitehall after working hours, civil servants gather to relax, drink, tell 
jokes and speculate on the progress of each other’s careers. As an uninitiated outsider, colleagues 
would take the trouble to explain to me the rules that were taken for granted when they discussed 
who was going for what job. These can be crudely summarised as: do not specialise; do be useful; 
and do find superior supporters.  At the end of the project on which I worked with Phillip, we 
went out for a celebratory drink. Another colleague explained to me that the last two projects he 
had worked on had been on the same topic, so it was time to move on. On a web chat page 
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hosted by a government department for its staff, I saw a discussion of how long was too long to 
spend in a job. ‘Never less than two years, never more than three’ was a typical contribution.   
Some civil servants I spoke to shared sentiments that were reported to Page and Jenkins (2005). 
They felt discouraged from developing specialist knowledge. As they moved quickly between 
policy areas, they were less likely to develop a thorough knowledge of the evidence base in any 
particular area. They were incentivised to become what Gendreau et al (2002) pejoratively 
describe as ‘fart catchers’; generalists who do not have enough expertise to resist whatever the 
minister decides will be the latest version of common sense. Although it should be said that 
many civil servants do develop a deeper knowledge of their particular policy area.  
 
Page and Jenkins (2005) suggest that the avoidance of technical specialisation is one way to 
avoid creating a conflict between bureaucratic hierarchy and expertise. Such conflict could 
introduce even more complication and delay into the policy process, which is already ‘elongated 
and ramshackle’ (Ibid: 81). The specialist knowledge that civil servants are incentivised to 
develop is not of the outside world. It is of the complex inner workings of Whitehall and of how 
to solve problems within it. In order to get ahead, civil servants need to get recognised for 
‘adding value’ to the policy process. They do this by creating connections and solving policy 
problems. They need to combine familiarity with the detail of current policy with dynamism, 
certainty and a degree of personal charisma. Of course, as in other professions (academia is no 
doubt one of them), there are many civil servants who lack these qualities. It is possible to 
advance through civil service ranks at a slower pace. But rapid advancement, of the type aspired 
to by my young colleagues, was dependent on building a reputation for usefulness.  
 
One female civil servant2 spoke of her frustration that, despite the formal commitment of the 
civil service to equality of opportunity, promotion often still depended on personal connections 
                                                          
2
 Her gender is probably significant. Despite explicit efforts to achieve greater gender equality (the current 
government target is to increase the proportion of women in top civil service management posts to 34%), the most 
senior ranks of the civil service are dominated by men. And so were the informal networking events that I observed. 
During evenings in the pub and football games in the park, personal connections of mutual affection and trust were 
developed. There were informal and formal events designed for women only. Being a man, I obviously could not 
observe these, but it seems that they would be less likely to lead to useful connections with current or future 
superiors, given the relative absence of women in the top echelons of the civil service. 
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with superiors in the hierarchy. She said, ‘it’s supposed to be open and equal but it’s not. People 
go for people they know. If you’ve worked with someone senior, you try and stay in touch with 
them. They can help you.’ This need to develop and maintain connections with more senior 
people requires that superiors come to think of potential protégés as both useful and reliable. The 
way to build trust is to provide evidence of trustworthiness. Another civil servant told me about 
an incident early in his career. He had been working on a policy area that had initially been based 
on North American evidence and been a high profile part of the government’s ‘agenda’. But 
evidence that it was not working was emerging. He reported that his boss had: 
 kind of jokingly said, “Well you’re young. Why don’t you suggest we look again at [policy area] 
and see how far that takes you in your career?” So there are certain areas where officials will self-





The third face of bureaucratic reason 
 
The combination of the need for effective persuasion, the control of uncertainty and the career 
incentives which operate within the civil service points towards an explanation of how civil 
servants use evidence in making policy. Policy making civil servants have to make a selection 
from the huge amount of information that they have at their disposal. They tend to see 
uncertainty as an obstacle to the development and agreement of policy proposals. And if civil 
servants are to contribute to the policy process and to their own career development, they must 
produce proposals that are useful to their superiors and can be accepted into government policy. 
These proposals must therefore fit with the existing narrative of government policy. It must be 
used to tell a story that is simultaneously about the policy area and about the story teller.  
 
The discursive categories and solutions that the story draws on will often have been set already 
by the general thrust of government policy, within the thought world that structures the approach 
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 An explanation of the knowledge that the boss was passing on is given by one of Walters’ interviewees who 
worked as criminologist inside the Home Office: ‘Put yourself in the position of a senior administrator in a 
government department; you don’t want some research officer telling you how to run the place, you’ve already got 
the minister telling you how to run the place’ (Walters 2003: 120). 
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that policy makers take. One such general story line was the belief in the power of the 
purchaser/provider split to increase value for money in public services.  This belief had been 
applied in the creation of the National Offender Management System (NOMS), but this was 
followed by years of delay, confusion and waste (see, for example, National Audit Office 2009). 
I encountered several civil servants who had bad things to say about NOMS, but nobody who 
questioned the underlying wisdom of the purchaser/provider split that it is supposed to achieve. 
This perhaps reflects the predominance of thinking in the style of the ‘new public management’ 
that has been noted by other analysts of British social policy (Greener 2009, Taylor-Gooby 2009). 
When I looked for the evidence that had been used to justify the initial and continued pursuit of 
this policy, I could find very little. A minister had replied to a Parliamentary question that the 
rationale was to be found in the original Carter review (Goggins 2005). When I read the report he 
referred to (Carter 2003), I could find only a vague reference to the supposed benefits of quasi-
markets, with no evidence provided to demonstrate where they had or could be achieved. When I 
raised this problem, and some of the academic analysis which questions the worth of quasi-
markets in the public sector with Mike, he responded that ‘it just feels intuitively right that 
introducing competition would focus more on cost and quality’. 
 
This intuitive faith in the application of private sector logic to public sector problems may seem 
to be what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) would call a ‘policy core belief’. It cropped up in 
many other meetings, where civil servants would present policy dilemmas as a failure in the 
structure of individual incentives, or ask how to encourage the private sector to provide solutions 
to public sector problems. However, in line with Hajer’s (1995) critique of Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, these ideas did not arise solely from the operation of individual belief in bringing like-
minded people together in ‘advocacy coalitions’.  Rather, the use of these expressions suggested 
to me the transfer and performance of discursive tropes among people who learn how to show 
both that they belong in this thought world and that they are worthy of promotion within it.  
 
There is an ideological process of ‘subjection-qualification’ at work here (Therborn 1980: 17). 
The currently dominant modes of thought constrain the limits of what civil servants think is 
possible. By reproducing these limits policy makers can qualify themselves to take up and 
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perform their role. In telling policy stories, they can signal that they hold appropriate, acceptable 
beliefs. Through the things that they were told, and the careers they saw acted out, the civil 
servants I worked with learnt that the stories they tell should not include uncertainty, complexity 
or opposition to the narrative that already dominates a policy field. For example, after I gave my 
views on the failures of current policies in a team meeting (views which none of my colleagues 
had disagreed with), Phillip said ‘I’d love to see you say that to a minister. You’d blow their 
mind!’ This jocular remark and the laughter which ensued reveal an implicit understanding 
which goes against my interviewee’s comment on telling truth to power. The joke implies that to 
tell people in power that their current narrative is fundamentally mistaken is (a) never done and 
(b) impossible to imagine doing, except in the absurd scenario of the joke.  A different colleague 
said on another occasion, ‘I think if you always use the evidence [when it conflicts with current 
policy] then you're always going to be the awkward person that’s saying, “the Emperor has no 
clothes”’. This would not be the way to be recognised for being useful, or to build connections 
with superiors who can support career progression. 
 
So for policy making civil servants, we can add a third face of the use of reason to the two that 
Bourdieu perceived amongst academics (2000: 109). The first face is the use of reason and 
empirical data to create knowledge. The second is the use of this performance of rational aptitude 
in order to show that one is worthy of respect and status. The civil servants I encountered did 
both these things, but there was also a third face of bureaucratic reason. It was the performance 
of only certain sections of the range of rationally justifiable positions in order to win the type of 
respect and personal connections that are necessary to achieve higher status. Acceptable 
positions to perform were those which reinforced rather than challenged the fundamental 
assumptions and tropes of current policy narratives. 
 
The silent silencing of inequality 
 
The analysis so far suggests that there is a surfeit of – mostly inconclusive - evidence and a 
distaste for uncertainty, complexity and contradiction within policy making circles. It suggests 
that civil servants learn to avoid such problematic features when they construct policy stories. 
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This does not mean that they deliberately avoid, neglect or misuse evidence. But they are 
influenced in their use of evidence by the constraints of a particular thought world, whose limits 
they reproduce in their turn. Civil servants in the corridors of power, just like the people targeted 
by the policies they develop, take part in the ‘structuration’ (Giddens 1979) of their social world. 
 
So let us test this emerging theoretical approach against a particular instance of the use of 
evidence on inequality in the policy areas I worked on – or rather its non-use. Power also 
operates by excluding certain ideas and possibilities from those that are considered in taking 
political action (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, Lukes 1974). Professor Richard Wilkinson was 
invited to give a presentation at a seminar held in the very grand rooms of the Admiralty. 
Surrounded by portraits of long-dead naval grandees, and an audience of senior policy makers 
from the Home Office, Cabinet Office, Prime Minister’s private office, the Department of Health 
and others, he summarised the findings of The Spirit Level (Wilkinson and Pickett 2008). This 
book lends itself well to PowerPoint presentation. It is, for instance, brim full of ‘killer charts’. 
These scatterplots have clear, diagonal lines of best fit. They show that greater levels of 
inequality are associated with a very wide range of social problems, including mortality, 
morbidity, mental illness, obesity, poor educational performance, teenage pregnancy, 
imprisonment, drug use and murder. A previous study has suggested that Wilkinson’s work is 
known in some governmental circles, but is discussed in ways that minimise the attention he 
pays to the causal impact of inequality itself. Instead, emphasis is put on the psycho-social 
processes that he implicates in the production of health inequalities (Smith 2007). At this 
seminar, Professor Wilkinson ran through his charts, explaining as he went that there are very 
good reasons to think that these associations are not just correlative; inequality causes these ills 
through various mechanisms. He competently dismissed alternative explanations that were put to 
him by some members of his audience. The very senior civil servants who took the roles of chair 
and discussant of the seminar both said that they found the presentation ‘compelling’ and 
‘convincing’.  
 
The next morning, fascinated by the reaction to this presentation, I made my only attempt to start 
off one of the email discussions that occasionally broke out amongst colleagues. I sent an email, 
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attaching a paper that Wilkinson uses to back his assertions (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005), and 
asking colleagues what policy proposals would make an appropriate response to this evidence. 
The result was a tumbleweed-blowing silence. Just as this electronic silence began, the civil 
servant who worked opposite me sat down at his desk. He asked if the previous evening’s 
seminar had been any good. When I told him that Wilkinson had argued that inequality causes 
virtually all social problems, he answered ‘didn’t we already know that?’ I replied, ‘if we know it 
already, why aren’t we doing anything about it?’ The response was, again, silence.  
 
Since the creation of the Social Exclusion Unit at least, there has been an explicit governmental 
focus on the reduction of problems that are related to inequality. However, this Unit and other 
government initiatives have been criticised for failing to counteract the political and economic 
sources of relative poverty (Chanan 1999; Palmer, MacInnes & Kenway 2007). The concept of 
social exclusion itself has been used, it has been argued, as a way of shifting attention away from 
inequality itself and particularly from the social harm caused by increases in income at the top 
end of the distribution (Béland 2007). These issues were not linked, by the civil servants I 
worked with, to the problems that our team was were dealing with. Silence on inequality 
prevailed. 
 
Here we see the downfall of the enlightenment model of the use of evidence in policy (Weiss 
1977). This model, simply stated, suggests that evidence affects policy indirectly by influencing 
the climate of opinion in which policy decisions are made. The problem is that, at this level of 
simplicity, it assumes that all evidence has a chance of influencing policy (Stevens 2007a). It 
misses a mechanism to explain why some evidence content is consistently ignored. In this 
example, we can see that evidence of the harmful effects of inequality - which is so 
comprehensively presented in Wilkinson’s work and a host of other sources - has informed 
people who play a significant role in making policy. They did not dispute that inequality is 
directly harmful. Indeed they claimed this was something they already knew. But this knowledge 
consistently failed to make a significant impact on policy making in the fields that my colleagues 




This is not because the importance of inequality in these policy areas is a recent discovery that 
has not yet had time to percolate into policy (see, for example, Bonger 1969 [first published 
1905]).  The causal and detrimental impact of inequality is a long standing current of thought 
that has been consistently excluded from the ‘policy streams’ that have influenced policy 
agendas (Kingdon 1995) in these areas. Even though relative poverty was an explicit focus of 
Labour’s policy on the areas I worked on while it was in opposition (Straw and Michael 1996), 
its importance as a focus of these policies had been minimised years before I started my work in 
government (Stevens 2007b).  When I tried to insert it in a meeting where my team discussed 
what the government could do to reduce the prevalence of a social problem we had been asked to 
look at, I was told that ‘the Gini coefficient is not a policy lever that we can pull’. So instead we 
looked for programmes that could ‘keep a lid’ on the effects of inequality, rather than doing 




While inequality has, in the phrase of Mathiesen (2004), been ‘silently silenced’, the search 
continues for policies to shout about that are tough. On my very first day of fieldwork, I took part 
in a meeting which discussed what else the government could do  - beyond final warnings, 
referral orders, anti-social behaviour contracts and orders, penalty notices for disorder, juvenile 
curfews, parenting orders, nurse-family partnerships, family intervention projects and the various 
other forms of ‘naughty step’ to which the government has tried to send this country’s unruly 
children and their parents (Gelsthorpe and Burney 2007) - to reduce bad behaviour by young 
people. ‘We need,’ the meeting was told, ‘to come up with tough, totemic policies.’  
 
This need to make a totem of toughness was consistently referred to throughout my fieldwork. 
Pressure was applied from the most senior levels to create policies that would signal the 
government’s willingness to be nasty to bad people
4
. At one meeting, the prime source of these 
                                                          
4
 This language may sound simplistic. More polite euphemisms were usually used. But the underlying assumption of 
dualism between a law-abiding majority and a reckless, feckless minority were expressed at one conference in the 
phrase ‘the job of policing is to protect the goodies and to stop the baddies’. 
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pressures emphasised the need to keep coming up with ‘totemic’ policies on crime and disorder, 
because of the high political salience of these issues. A totem, according to anthropologists 
following Lévi-Strauss (1964), is a cultural symbol that is used to provide a metaphorical 
representation of collective identity. Totems are central to the stories that cultures tell themselves 
about who they are. The transfer of this metaphor from the study of remote tribes to the everyday 
language of civil servants is somewhat remarkable. Its application to toughness is even more so. 
The phrase ‘totemic’ was often used alongside the word tough, and never mentioned in the 
context of reducing poverty or inequality. The use of this term reveals a central, symbolic thrust 
of government policies. It tells us about the stories that the civil servants I worked with have 
been encouraged to tell. These stories were most likely to find favour when they told us that, as a 
nation, we are a robust and unforgiving people, divided between a group of law-abiding 
innocents who are worthy  of protection and support, and a group of threatening outsiders who 
are worthy of little but material exclusion and symbolic expurgation. At that early meeting on 
young people, one of my colleagues said, ‘we know who we’re talking about. It’s not the public 
schoolkids waiting at the bus stop, it’s those other kids’. Totemic toughness applies only to the 
visible, poor and excluded social groups who have been so consistently ‘othered’ in 




Telling stories about the policy process runs the risk of replicating some of the mechanisms that I 
have described. I have tried to shape a coherent narrative out of the messy business of policy 
making. I have, however, tried to show my own methods and uncertainties so that readers can 
judge whether my narrative fits the reality of this process, or just the tropes and assumptions of 
academic discourse on policy-making. I sought examples which contradict my suggestion that 
evidence is used selectively in creating convincing, acceptable policy stories. There are indeed 
many policy discussions and documents that make explicit use of evidence, but few use available 
evidence that challenges the contemporary distribution of power. I found some instances of the 
use of evidence that challenged currently dominant tropes of government policy (e.g. the ideas 
that the imprisonment of children and a high number of warranted police officers are important 
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policy tools in creating safer communities) in policy discussions and documents. These instances 
did not, during my fieldwork, lead to adoption of policies that were based on the challenging 
evidence. They were selected out of the policy process during the iterative discussions between 
policy makers. 
 
The data I have presented suggests that there are inherent difficulties in providing and using 
evidence on policy issues. These include the vast amount of available information, as well as the 
indeterminacy and the lengthy timescales of academic research and other evidence. Such 
difficulties are often seen as causes of the failure to base policy on evidence (Nutley and Davies 
2000; Nutley, Walter, and Bland 2002; Valentine 2009). But the problem lies deeper than this. 
This article suggests that governmental communication on the policy areas on which I worked is 
‘systematically distorted’ (Habermas, 2002)
5
. It does not have to involve deliberate falsehood or 
direct manipulation of the evidence in order to count as ideological, in the sense that it supports 
systematically asymmetrical relations of power (Thompson, 1990). The exercise of power and 
the desire of policy makers for the maintenance and enhancement of the prevailing order and of 
their own status within it can short-circuit the thorough use of the available evidence, in what I 
have described (following Bourdieu) as the operation of the third face of selective, bureaucratic 
reason. Interpersonal interactions within the state contributed to this distortion. Wider analysis of 
policy and its effects would be necessary to examine all its effects. But one effect we can see 
from this analysis is that the use of evidence tended to support a certain way of thinking about 
the world; a thought style which is produced through the unequal distribution of power and then 
plays a part in its reproduction.  
 
As Hill (2009) has noted, different theoretical perspectives may have more explanatory potential 
in analysing some policy areas than others. For example, he argues that analysis of recent British 
government policy on child poverty takes us ‘directly into the critique of pluralism’ (Ibid:112) 
which he summarises in the statement, ‘[p]ower is distributed unequally both inside and outside 
                                                          
5
 This concept is based on Habermas’ theory of the ‘ideal speech situation’, which lays out the presuppositions of 
communicative action. When the reaching of consensus through dialogue is bypassed by the use of money or power, 
then communication loses its ideal, emancipatory character. It distorts the principles which give the possibility of 
meaning to communication. 
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government, having an impact as much as what is on the agenda and the context in which 
decisions are taken as on the decision process itself’ (Ibid: 107). This position is apposite to my 
experience of working within government, as it is also to Smith’s (2007) study of the roles of 
ideas and research evidence in making policy on health inequalities. The pluralist approach tends 
to pay less attention to the structuring of power in and around the state. Nutley, Davies and 
Walter (2007) note the politically tactical uses of research and present useful recommendations 
for researchers and policy makers who hope to increase the use of evidence. But they do not go 
as far as the analysis presented here in examining the strategic, ideological use of evidence which 
reduced the potential of such efforts in the policy areas I worked on. 
 
The stories I have presented do not tell us all we need to know about the policy process. They 
cannot, for example, explain policy change, as would need to be done by a comprehensive theory 
of policy formation (John 1998). Six months is too short a time to analyse policy change, which 
typically takes place in cycles as long as a decade (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993). A longer 
timescale and additional methods would be necessary to add an explanation of policy change to 
the insights developed here. 
 
Faith in the ideal of evidence-based policy dies hard. An eminent scientist with long experience 
of advising policy makers has recently been quoted as saying that ‘nobody rational could 
possibly want a government based on any other type of policy-making’ (Colin Blakemore, 
quoted by Doward, Hinsliff, and McKie 2009  ). This ethnographic analysis of the process of 
making policy suggests that holders of this faith may have to wait a while to see the ascension of 
their preferred method of policy-making. It has shown that a there is little conclusive evidence 
available for policy makers in the vast mass of information that is available to them. A certain 
group of policy makers chose some of this information as evidence to tell stories. They selected 
evidence that fitted with the stories that have previously constructed their unquestioned concept 
of public value. This arose ideologically from the extant distribution of power, which structured 
their capability to take part in policy decisions. They used evidence to tell stories that were likely 
to be accepted within a thought world that favoured certainty over accuracy and action over 
contradiction. They attempted to transform issues of ethical value into questions of financial 
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value. They usually displayed a utilitarian lack of normative engagement with ideas on the 
fundamental aims of public policy, leaving the pursuit of bureaucratic competence and career 
advancement as primary goals. The stories they told, and the evidence they used in telling them, 
were biased towards the rationalisation and reification of the uneven balance of power that 
constitutes the British state. The civil servants I worked with were not encouraged to select 
evidence which challenged the unequal status quo for use in telling these policy stories. These 
stories therefore ultimately supported the consolidation of power in the hands of the people who 
already hold it. This made their policy making an intensely ideological activity - not in the sense 
that it used the kind of political doctrine that the New labour project explicitly rejected, but 
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